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THE INSTRUMENTS OF PRE-BORDER CONTROL IN THE EU: A 
NEW SOURCE OF VULNERABILITY FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS?
Maria NAGORE CASAS1
I.- INTRODUCTION: SECURITIZATION OF BORDERS AND 
VULNERABILITY OF ASYLUM SEEKERS. II.- THE MAIN EU AND MEMBER 
STATES’ INSTRUMENTS OF PRE-BORDER CONTROL. III.- COMPATIBILITY 
OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF PRE-BORDER CONTROL WITH THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
NON-REFOULEMENT. IV.- CONCLUSION.
ABSTRACT: This article explores the system of pre-border control instruments that have been 
implemented by the EU and Member States in order to prevent asylum seekers from accessing the 
EU territory. The main argument is that these instruments constitute a new source of vulnerability 
for asylum-seekers and refugees. The article analyses some of the main passive and active measures 
of interception of refugees (EU Visa Regime, carrier sanctions, Immigration Liaison Officers and 
interception at sea) and the main legal problems regarding their compatibility with the international 
legal framework for the protection of refugees, notably with the principle of non-refoulement.
KEY WORDS: pre-border control, refugees’ vulnerability, EU Visa Regime, carrier sanctions, 
Immigration Liaison Officers, interception of refugees at sea.
LOS INSTRUMENTOS DE PRE-CONTROL FRONTERIZO EN LA UE: ¿UNA NUEVA 
FUENTE DE VULNERABILIDAD PARA LOS SOLICITANTES DE ASILO?
RESUMEN: Este artículo explora el sistema de instrumentos de pre-control fronterizo que han sido 
implementados por la UE y sus Estados Miembros con el fin de evitar el acceso de los solicitantes 
de asilo al territorio de la UE. El principal argumento es que estos instrumentos constituyen una 
nueva fuente de vulnerabilidad para los refugiados y solicitantes de asilo. El artículo analiza algu-
nas de las principales medidas activas y pasivas de interceptación de refugiados (Régimen Europeo 
de Visados, sanciones a los transportistas, Oficiales de Enlace de Inmigración e interceptación en el 
mar) y los principales problemas que plantean respecto de su compatibilidad con el marco jurídico 
internacional de protección de los refugiados, en especial, con el principio de non-refoulement.
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peo de Visados, sanciones a los transportistas, Oficiales de Enlace de Inmigración, interceptación 
de refugiados en el mar.
LES INSTRUMENTS DE PRÉ-CONTRÔLE FRONTALIER DANS L’UE: UNE NOUVELLE 
CAUSE DE VULNERABILITÉ POUR LE SOLICITANT D’ASILE?
RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine le système d’instruments de pré-contrôle frontalier mis en place 
par l’UE et ses États membres avec la finalité d’éviter l’accès des solicitants d’asile au territoire de 
l’UE. L’argument principal développé dans cet article est que ces instruments consituent un nou-
veau cause de vulnerabilité pour les réfugiés et solicitants d’asile. L’article analyse quelques des 
principales mesures actives et passives d’interceptation des réfugiés (Régime Européen des Visas, 
sanctions contre les trasporteurs, officiers de liason d’immigration et interception des réfugiés en 
mer) et les problémes que posent en relation avec son compatibilité avec le cadre juridique interna-
tional de protection des réfugiés, en particulier, le principe de non-refoulement. 
MOT CLÉ: pré-contrôle frontalier, vulnerabilité des réfugiés, Régime Européen des Visas, sanc-
tions contre les trasporteurs, officiers de liason d’immigration, interception des réfugiés en mer.
I. INTRODUCTION: 
 SECURITIZATION OF BORDERS AND VULNERABILITY OF ASYLUM SEEKERS
One of  the most controversial issues regarding the legal protection of  re-
fugees is the determination of  the exact scope of  States’ obligations towards 
them, in particular, towards those who have not yet crossed the State of  
destination’s borders. Governments, international organisations, scholars and 
policy-makers’ views on the territorial scope of  these obligations differ due, 
among other reasons, to the lack of  clarity regarding paramount elements 
of  the legal framework to be applied, such as the status of  individuals under 
international law, the way in which international treaties should be interpreted 
or under which circumstances the obligations of  States vis-à-vis individuals 
are engaged.2 States tend to consider that their obligations to protect do not 
arise until the refugee has crossed their frontiers, while at the same time their 
involvement in extraterritorial activities aimed at preventing refugees from 
reaching their territories has increased significantly. 
There are many cases in practice which illustrate the tension between 
States’ obligations to protect and their deterrence activities. To cite but a 
few examples in case law, according to the UK government, the posting of  
immigration officers in a foreign airport in order to refuse leave to enter into 
2 Gil Bazo, M. T.: “The Practice of  Mediterranean States in the context of  the European 
Union”s Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension: The Safe Third Country Concept 
Revisited”, International Journal of  Refugee Law, Nº 18(2–3), 2006, pp. 571, 571–572.
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the UK to undesired passengers was not contrary to the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention.3 In Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the Italian government argued that 
systematic “push-backs” of  Libyan migrants in foreign territorial waters were 
lawful under the bilateral agreements signed between Italy and Libya between 
2007 and 2009.4 In J.H.A. v. Spain, the Spanish government argued that the 
interception of  a boat in the territorial waters of  a third country did not 
amount to an exercise of  jurisdiction.5 These are just a few examples of  the 
externalisation of  border control activities by States, as well as their attempt 
to consider these activities lawful and respectful of  their legal obligations un-
der the international regime of  protection of  refugees, in particular regarding 
the principle of  non-refoulement.6
Despite this attempt by States to pretend to be in compliance with inter-
national refugee law, many commentators postulate that the increasing extra-
territorial activity of  States has the intention of  precisely avoiding their obli-
gations of  protection once the individuals manage to cross their frontiers.7 
States have developed a complex system of  deterrence measures, which in 
practice impede any contact by refugees with the territory of  the receiving 
State. It is thereby often argued by NGOs and scholars that there is a huge 
3 Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma 
Rights Centre and others (Appellants), [2004] UKHL 55.
4 European Court of  Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy App no 
27765/09 (ECtHR (GC) 23 February 2012) para 92.
5 Committee against Torture, J.H.A. v Spain, Communication no 323/2007, CAT/C/41/
D323/2007, para 6.1.
6 This principle is laid down in Article 33.1 of  the Convention relating to the Status of  Refu-
gees, adopted on 28 July 1951 by the United Nations Conference of  Plenipotentiaries on the 
Status of  Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly resolution 429 
(V) of  14 December 1950 (Refugee Convention). 
7 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and HatHaway, J.C., “Non-Refoulement in a World of  Coopera-
tive Deterrence”, Columbia Journal of  Transnational Law, nº 53, 2015, p. 235; Goodwin-Gill, 
G.S. and mcadam, J., The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2007, 
pp. 369–371; Guild, E. and BiGo, D., “The transformation of  European Border Controls” 
in Ryan, B. and mitsileGas. V. (eds.) Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges, Marti-
nus Nijhoff  Publishers, 2010, p. 257; den HeijeR, M., Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum, Hart 
Publishing, 2012, p. 166; moReno lax, V., “Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against 
a Fragmentary Reading of  EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea”, International 
Journal of  Refugee Law, nº 23(2), 2011, p. 174; 
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gap between the rhetoric of  States and their attitudes in practice.8 On the one 
hand, States are pledging their commitment to refugee law, but on the other, 
they are not keen to assume obligations in practice. This “schizophrenic atti-
tude” of  States towards international refugee law has given rise, in the words 
of  Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, to the “politics of  non-entrée” aimed 
at “ensuring that refugees shall not be allowed to arrive.”9
In addition to “politics of  non-entrée”, several terms have been used by 
scholars to refer to this phenomenon, which is subject to increasing attention 
by literature and media: “outsourcing, externalisation, offshoring or extra-
territorialisation of  migration management; external migration governance; 
remote migration policing”;10 “de-territorialization of  border control”;11 “po-
litics of  extraterritorial processing”;12 “neo-refoulement”;13 or “limes impe-
rii”.14 All of  these terms refer to the various types of  interception measures 
used by States against asylum-seekers and refugees, measures which are usua-
lly developed by the wealthiest States, notably the United States, Australia, 
Canada and EU Member States. 
Many factors explain State engagement in extraterritorial activities. 
Among them, one which has to be mentioned in order to frame the discus-
sion is that in the post-9/11 context asylum is increasingly categorised as a 
8 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and Hathaway, J.C., op. cit.; Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and Mca-
dam, J., op. cit.; Doctors Without Borders, Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers: 
Vulnerable People at Europe”s Doorstep, MSF, 2009; CEAR (Comisión de Ayuda al 
Refugiado) Euskadi, The Externalization of Borders: Migration Control and the Right 
to Asylum: A Framework for Advocacy”, CEAR, 2012.
9 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and HatHaway, J.C., op. cit., p. 241. 
10 These terms are listed by den HeijeR, M., op. cit., p. 3. See also mcnamaRa, F., “Member 
State Responsibility for Migration Control within Third States — Externalisation revisited”, 
European Journal of  Migration and Law, nº 15, 2013, p. 326.
11 tRevisanut, S., “The Principle of  Non-Refoulement and the De-Territorialization of  Bor-
der Control at Sea”, Leiden Journal of  International Law, nº 27, 2014, p. 661. 
12 afeef, K.F., “The Politics of  Extraterritorial Processing: Offshore Asylum Policies in Eu-
rope and the Pacific”, Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper, nº 36, 2006, p. 2.
13 Hyndman, J., and mountz, A., “Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the 
Externalization of  Asylum by Australia and Europe”, Government and Opposition, nº 43(2), 
2008, p. 249.
14 del valle Gálvez, A.,“Unión Europea, Crisis de Refugiados y Limes Imperii”, Revista 
General de Derecho Europeo, nº 38, 2016, p. 1.
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“security issue”, including by the EU Member States. This has caused a shift 
from legal discourses based on the protection of  refugees to “more geopoli-
tical projects based on security.”15 The legal dimension of  refugee protection 
based on the guarantees provided by international instruments has given way 
to a political dimension where the priority is the management of  migrant 
flows in regions of  origin and preventing asylum seekers from reaching the 
territories of  states.16 This “securitization of  asylum” has always been present 
in the EU Schengen Acquis. A recent example is found in European Coun-
cil Conclusions of  20 June 2019 where the European Council establishes a 
“New Strategic Agenda 2019 – 2024.” One of  the four main priorities for the 
EU in this period is “protecting citizens and freedoms” which implies ensu-
ring the integrity of  EU’s territory. According to the European Council: “We 
need to know and be the ones to decide who enters the EU. Effective control 
of  the external borders is an absolute prerequisite for guaranteeing security, 
upholding law and order, and ensuring properly functioning EU policies, in 
line with our principles and values.”17
The “near-obsession”18 of  States with migration control contrasts with 
the human needs and vulnerability of  asylum seekers. The main argument 
of  this article is that the “politics of  non-entrée” constitutes in itself  ano-
ther source of  vulnerability for asylum-seekers. In addition to the causes of  
persecution in their own countries and the “contextual” and “compounded” 
vulnerability they face,19 asylum seekers’ vulnerability is exacerbated by some 
of  the pre-border control instruments that will be analysed here. One alar-
ming example is the direct relationship between migration control and hu-
15 Hyndman, J., and mountz, A., op. cit, pp. 249 and 251.
16 Hyndman, J., and mountz, A., op. cit., pp. 250–252; del valle Gálvez, A., op. cit., p. 13; 
and valsamis, M., “Immigration Control in an Era of  Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, 
Weakening Citizens and Strengthening the State”, Indiana Journal of  Global Legal Studies, nº 
19(1),  2012, pp. 3 and 45–59.
17 European Council meeting (20 June 2019), EUCO 9/19, Annex “A New Strategic Agenda 
2019 – 2024”, pp.  6 – 7.
18 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and HatHaway, J.C., op. cit., 235- 236.
19 mustaniemi-laakso, M., “Vulnerability in EU policies on asylum and irregular migration” 
in FRAME Deliverable 11.3, The protection of  vulnerable individuals in the context of  EU policies on 
border checks, asylum and immigration, 11-24, <http://www.fp7-frame.eu/reports/>.
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man smuggling, which has been denounced by several authors and NGOs.20 
This phenomenon has been described as “a never-ending race between bor-
der authorities and ever more inventive human smugglers,” which in practical 
terms implies that for each loophole closed by border authorities two new 
modes of  unauthorised entry come up.21 In addition, the urgency of  some 
EU Member States to combat irregular migration has exposed refugees to 
serious risks by giving rise to episodes of  non-rescue, disputes over responsi-
bility towards refugees and diversion of  ships to third countries’ ports.22 This 
has unfortunately been the central dynamic regarding the rescue operations 
in the Mediterranean Sea during this summer.23
According to the Red Cross some EU migration policy choices expose 
refugees to great vulnerabilities along their way to the EU and Schengen area, 
notably violence and human-trafficking and dangerous journeys to reach the 
EU’s external borders24 The use by migrants of  dangerous routes to Europe 
in the absence of  regular and safer migration opportunities has been indeed 
considered a violation of  the right to life.25 The Commissioner for Human 
Rights of  the Council of  Europe identified the journey of  migrants to Euro-
pe as one of  the points in the migration cycle where vulnerability is greatest 
and alerted that one of  the drivers of  vulnerability is the “excessive use of  
force by law enforcement officials charged with border control.”26
Furthermore, it must be stressed that the most urgent need of  refugees 
is to secure entry into a territory where they can find safety from the circum-
20 CEAR, op. cit., 9.
21 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and HatHaway, J.C., op. cit., pp. 235 and 237.
22 moReno lax, V., op. cit., p. 174.
23 BBc news mundo, “Es infame el silencio de Europa: Open Arms y Ocean Viking, los 
barcos que deambulan por el Mediterráneo llenos de migrantes (y la respuesta de los países 
involucrados)”, 13 August 2019; Rtve noticias, “El Open Arms atraca en el puerto de 
Lampedusa con 83 migrantes a bordo tras 19 días de incertidumbre”, 20 August 2019.
24 Red cRoss EU office, “Addressing the Vulnerabilities linked to Migratory Routes to the 
European Union” RCEU 12/2015-002 Position Paper 1.
25 European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Migrants in the Mediter-
ranean: Protecting human rights (Study by coGolati, S., veRlinden, N., and scHmitt, P.), 
2015, EP/EXPO/B/DROI/2015/01, p. 30.
26 council of euRope, commissioneR foR Human RiGHts, “The Human Rights of  irregular 
migrants in Europe”, CommDH/IssuePaper Nº 1, 2007, pp. 3 and 8-9.
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stances that led them to flee. Restrictions to this basic need may have serious 
consequences for refugees’ protection: refugees denied entry into a country 
are likely to be returned to the risk of  persecution in their countries of  origin 
or to be condemned to “perpetual orbit” in search of  a State which allows 
them to enter.27
In spite of  the increasing contextual and compounded vulnerabilities of  
asylum seekers, these State practices pose a variety of  legal issues as they cha-
llenge not only the international legal framework for the protection of  refu-
gees, notably the principle of  non-refoulement, but also well-established human 
rights such as the right to freedom of  movement28 and the right to leave any 
country, including one’s own country.29 States that through these measures 
obstruct access to asylum procedures or impose barriers on the individual’s 
right to leave any country may breach their obligations under the Refugee 
Convention and the human rights treaties to which they are party. In addition, 
it is necessary to recall that all EU Member States are parties to the ECHR 
and consenquently they are bound by the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR regar-
ding vulnerability of  asylum-seekers. According to the ECtHR their vulnera-
bility is “inherent in his situation of  asylum seeker.”30 This involves that every 
asylum-seeker must be deemed to be vulnerable, regardless their particular 
circumstances. They are vulnerable because of  their belonging to this grou-
pand States should consider this inherent vulnerability when implementing 
their policies.31
The aim of  this article is to analyse some of  these instruments of  pre-bor-
der control implemented within the EU in order to assess to what extent they 
27 James C. HatHaway, J.C., The Rights of  Refugees under International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, p. 279.
28 Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by resolution 217 A (III) of  the UN 
General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, art 13(1).
29 International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of  16 December 
1966, art 12(2) and UDHR, art 13(2). 
30 M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011).
31 BRandl, U. and czecH, P., “General and Specific Vulnerability of  Protection-Seekers in the 
EU: Is there an Adequate Response to their Needs?” in ippolito, F. and iGlesias sáncHez, 
S., Protecting Vulnerable Groups. The European Human Rights Framework, Hart Publishing, 2015, 
pp. 249-251.
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generate or increase refugees’ vulnerabilities and to discuss some of  the legal 
problems regarding their compatibility with the international legal framework 
for the protection of  refugees, notably with the principle of  non-refoulement 
set forth in the 1951 Refugee Convention and some of  the main human ri-
ghts law instruments. These problems will be addressed in section III below, 
whilst section II will provide an overview of  some of  the main instruments 
of  pre-border control carried out by the EU and the Member States. Finally, 
section IV will provide some conclusions.
II. THE MAIN EU AND MEMBER STATES’ INSTRUMENTS  
OF PRE-BORDER CONTROL
At the EU level, extraterritorial practices to control borders have to be 
historically framed in the process of  European integration and the abolition 
of  internal borders to facilitate the freedom of  movement of  persons, capital 
and goods. Once an internal space without borders was created, the protec-
tion of  this space against the entrance of  undesired categories of  persons, 
capital and goods became a clear priority within the EU.32 As the Preamble 
of  the 2006 Schengen Borders Code (SBC) stated, “the creation of  an area 
in which persons may move freely is to be flanked by other measures” and 
“the common policy on the crossing of  external borders, as provided for by 
Article 62(2) of  the Treaty, is such a measure.”33
The need to control the external borders of  the EU appeared at the very 
beginning of  the shaping of  the EU immigration and asylum policy. In parti-
cular, some authors situate the origins of  the externalisation of  immigration 
policies by the EU in the concept of  “preventive protection” introduced in 
1993 by the then-UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, which 
was promptly adopted by the EU institutions. Ogata emphasized the “right 
to remain in one’s home country” over the traditional dominant discourse 
of  the “right to leave”. This concept served as a basis for the creation of  an 
32 Gil Bazo, M.T., loc. cit., pp. 571 - 572.
33 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 
March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of  per-
sons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [2006] OJ L105 (consolidated version 2013), 
preamble para 2, repealed by Regulation 2016/399 of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council of  9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of  persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification) OJ L77/1.
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“incremental and invisible policy wall around the EU”.34 In the 1994 Com-
munication on Immigration and Asylum Policies the European Commission 
identified three main elements of  these policies: “Taking action on migration 
pressure, “Controlling migration flows” and “strengthening integration po-
licies for the benefit of  legal immigrants.”35 The protection of  refugees and 
other persons in need of  international protection were addressed within the 
second area (controlling migration flows) along with admission policies and 
measures to fight against illegal migration. This threefold distinction between 
“legal immigration”, “illegal immigration” and “asylum” has characterised 
this area of  European policy since its very beginning. Border control and 
other migration enforcement measures reflected this distinction.36  However, 
one of  the main flaws in the European immigration and asylum policy is pre-
cisely the lack of  an effective distinction between these different categories in 
the context of  the current mixed flows of  migrants.37
The 1994 immigration and asylum policy proposal relied on strong coo-
peration with the countries of  origin of  refugees. This external dimension 
of  the policy has since been present in all the EU’s policy formulation docu-
ments: the Tampere European Council of  October 1999,38 the 2004 Hague 
Programme,39 the 2005 Global Approach to Migration,40 the 2008 European 
34 Hyndman, J., and mountz, A., pp. 249, 252 and 262.
35 Commission of  the European Communities, Communication form the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies [1994] COM(94) 
23 final.
36 According to COM(994) 23 final, para 70: “The first task in controlling migration is to 
formulate basic principles in order to reflect the distinction between migration pressure and 
other forms of  migration. Admission policies will necessarily represent this distinction: they 
cannot be purely restrictive as they should respect international obligations and humanitarian 
traditions in general. Hence, controlling migration does not necessarily imply bringing it to 
an end: it means migration management.”
37 den HeijeR, M., op. cit., pp.165–166.
38 Council, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999. Presidency Conclusions.
39 Council of  the EU, The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in 
the European Union [2004] 16054/04 JAI 559.
40 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  
the Regions “The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” [2011] COM(2011) 743 final.
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Pact on Immigration and Asylum,41 the 2010 Stockholm Programme,42 and 
the 2015 European Agenda on Migration.43 An important feature of  the EU’s 
immigration and asylum policy is precisely the distinction between the inter-
nal and the external dimensions of  this policy. In parallel to the system of  
rules which sets forth entry conditions into the EU, admissibility criteria and 
enforcement measures, laid down mainly in the SBC and the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System, the EU has developed an external dimension of  this 
policy which comprises, on the one hand, a set of  instruments based on the 
remote control of  the EU’s external borders (“Integrated management of  the 
external borders”) and, on the other hand, those measures aimed at enhan-
cing the capacity in third countries to “handle migratory flows and protracted 
refugee situations” (External Asylum Policy).44
The instruments which will be discussed in this section respond to the 
concept of  “Integrated Management of  the External Borders”. This concept 
was first established by the European Commission in its 2002 Communica-
tion entitled “Towards Integrated Management of  the External Borders of  
the Member States of  the European Union”,45 and subsequently adopted 
by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in its “Plan for the management 
of  the external borders of  the Member States of  the European Union”.46 
The concept refers to the establishment of  a “framework of  an integrated 
strategy which takes progressively into account the multiplicity of  aspects to 
the management of  the external borders” of  the EU.47 Three specific compo-
41 Council of  the EU, European Pact  on Immigration and Asylum [2008] 13440/08 ASIM 
72.
42 European Council, The Stockholm Programme — An Open and Secure Europe Serving 
and Protecting Citizens [2010] OJ C115/1.
43 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  
the Regions, A European Agenda on Migration [2015] COM(2015) 240 final.
44 European Council, The Stockholm Programme, op. cit., para 6.2.3.
45 Commission of  the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament “Towards Integrated Management of  the External 
Borders of  the Member States of  the European Union” [2002] COM(2002) 233 final.
46 Council of  the European Union, “Plan for the management of  the external borders of  the 
Member States of  the European Union” [2002] 10019/02. 
47 COM(2002) 233 final, para 6.
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nents can be identified in this strategy: (i) a common corpus of  legislation, in 
particular the SBC; (ii) operational cooperation between EU Member States, 
including cooperation implemented through Frontex, and (iii) solidarity be-
tween Member States by means of  the establishment of  an External Borders 
Fund.48 This strategy is strongly focused on ensuring security at external bor-
ders and is based on the idea that border controls are more effective if  they 
are implemented across the various stages of  an immigrant’s travel towards 
the EU.49
On 15 December 2015 the European Commission adopted a new set 
of  measures to manage Europe’s external borders, including the creation 
of  a European Border and Coast Guard50 and a European travel document 
for the return of  illegally staying third-country nationals.51 In addition, on 6 
April 2016, the Commission adopted its Communication entitled “towards 
a reform of  the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal 
Avenues to Europe.”52 In this Communication, one of  the most controversial 
“new generation measure”, that is, the signing of  a Joint Action Plan with 
Turkey in October 2015 in the current context of  the Syrian refugee crisis in 
48 Council of  the European Union, Council Conclusions on Integrated Border Management, 
2768th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 4–5 December 2006, p. 1.
49 den HeijeR, M., op. cit., p. 172; acosta sáncHez, M.A. and González GaRcía, I., “Tri-
bunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea - TJUE - Sentencia de 05.09.2012, Parlamento c. 
Consejo C-355/10, ’Código de fronteras Schengen - Decisión 2010/252/UE - Vigilancia 
de las fronteras marítimas exteriores - Normas adicionales sobre la vigilancia de fronteras - 
Competencias de ejecución de la Comisión - Alcance’. Vigilancia de fronteras marítimas y 
elementos esenciales en los actos de ejecución”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, nº 47, 
2014, pp. 270 - 271.
50 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  
the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC [2015] 
COM(2015) 671 final, 2015/0310 (COD). The European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
(Frontex) was finally established by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of  14 September 2016 on 
the European Border and Coast Guard.
51 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  
the Council on a European travel document for the return of  illegally staying third-country 
nationals [2015] COM(2015) 668 final, 2015/0306 (COD).
52 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council, Towards a Reform of  the Common European Asylum System and 
Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe [2016] COM(2016) 197 final. 
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Europe, was deemed as a “legal channel of  resettlement” and a “mechanism 
to substitute irregular and dangerous migrant crossing from Turkey to the 
Greek islands”.53 The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan54 was highly criticised 
because it ignored the conditions of  poverty suffered by the over 2 million 
refugees that Turkey had already received, as well as Turkey’s poor human 
rights record and its inadequate asylum system. In fact, by the end of  2015 
forced returns by Turkey of  refugees and asylum-seekers to Syria and Iraq 
were reported.55
Despite criticism, this Plan was confirmed on 16 March 2016 by means 
of  the controversial “EU - Turkey Statement” which included eight new lines 
of  action, among them, the return to Turkey of  all new irregular migrants 
crossing form Turkey into Greek Islands and the resettlement form Turkey 
to the EU of  one Syrian for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from 
Greek Islands, taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria.56 The im-
plementation of  the EU -Turkey Statement has been deemed by the EU as 
a success. According to the European Commission, in March 2019 irregular 
arrivals remain 97% lower than the period before the Statement became ope-
rational.57 This Statement has implied a significant shift in the external di-
mension of  the EU’s migration policy which is increasingly oriented towards 
the conclusion of  agreements with the States of  origin. Indeed, in the Malta 
Declaration of  the European Council of  3 February 2017, the key measure is 
the intensification of  cooperation with countries of  origin or transit, in order 
53 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council, Towards a Reform of  the Common European Asylum System and 
Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe [2016] COM(2016) 197 final, 14-15.
54 European Commission, “EU-Turkey joint action plan” [2015] MEMO/15/5860, 1–2.
55 amnesty inteRnational, Amnesty International Report 2015/16: The State of  the World”s Hu-
man Rights (Amnesty International 2016), 43. See also CEAR, Lesbos, “zona cero” del derecho de 
asilo, CEAR, 2016, 33 and Red cRoss, “The EU-Turkey migration deal: a lack of  empathy 
and humanity – Opinion of  23 Red Cross National Societies”, 2016.
56 European Council, EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press Release 144/16. 
57 European Commission, “EU – Turkey Statement. Three years on”, March 2019.
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to “contain (in these countries) illegal flows to the EU.”58 In particular, the 
focus is now on strengthening relations with Libya.59
1. PASSIVE AND ACTIVE INTERCEPTION
Although there is not an internationally accepted definition of  “intercep-
tion”, the Executive Committee of  the High Commissioner’s Programme in 
2000 proposed one, which is often referred to by scholars.60 According to the 
proposed definition, interception comprises “all measures applied by a State, 
outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the movement 
of  persons without the required documentation crossing international bor-
ders by land, air or sea, and making their way to the country of  prospective 
destination.”61 This definition, which highlights the extraterritorial character 
of  the interception measures, encompasses both “physical or active measu-
res” of  interception, such as interception of  boats at sea, and “passive or ad-
ministrative measures”, such as the deployment of  immigration control offi-
cers in foreign countries, visa requirements, carrier sanctions or financial and 
other assistance to origin or transit countries. The structure of  this section 
will follow this distinction between passive and active measures of  interception. 
A. PASSIVE MEASURES OF INTERCEPTION
a. The EU Visa Regime
The EU has established a common visa policy for stays in the territories 
of  the Member States not exceeding three months in any six-month period.62 
58 European Council, Malta Declaration by the members of  the European Council on the exter-
nal aspects of  migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route, 3 February 2017, para 2.
59 Malta Declaration, para 5 – 6.
60 moReno lax, V., “Must EU Borders have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of  
Schengen Visas and Carriers” Sanctions with EU Member States” Obligations to Provide 
International Protection to Refugees”, European Journal of  Migration and Law, nº 10, 2008, pp. 
315, 322 and 323; Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and mcadam, J., op. cit., 371-372.
61 Executive Committee of  the High Commissioner”s Programme, Standing Committee, 
“Interception of  Asylum Seekers and Refugees: the International Framework and Recom-
mendations for a Comprehensive Approach” [2000] EC/50/SC/CRP.17, para 10, emphasis 
added.
62 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  13 July 
2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) [2009] L 243/1, art 1.1 (“Visa 
Code”).
The Instruments of  Pre-border Control in the EU: A New Source of  Vulnerability for Asylum Seekers?
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 7, janvier-décembre 2019, pp. 161-198
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.05
174
The Visa requirements were first established in the Convention Implemen-
ting the Schengen Agreement (CISA),63 and subsequently governed by Arti-
cle 5 of  the 2006 SBC which stated the general entry conditions which must 
be fulfilled by third-country nationals to be allowed entry into the Schengen 
area.64 Regulation 2018/1806 (Visa Requirement Regulation) lists the non-
EU countries whose nationals must be in possession of  a visa when crossing 
the external borders of  the EU. This is the so-called “black list” of  Annex 
I of  the Visa Requirement Regulation, whereas Annex II lists the countries 
whose nationals are exempt from requesting a visa (“white list”).65 A conside-
rable number of  “refugee-producing” countries are included in the black list, 
for example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Syria.
Regulation 2018/1806 does not include any reference to refugees or 
asylum seekers. Only, with respect to “recognized refugees”, it is established 
that they will be required to obtain a visa or be exempt from it, depending 
on whether the third country in which they reside and that have issued their 
travel documents is included in the black list or the white one.66 That is, even 
refugees who have been formally recognized as such by a third State are re-
quired to have the mandatory visa if  they come from a blacklisted country. 
Regarding refugees not formally recognized, the regulation is silent.
In addition to the lists, certain procedures and conditions for issuing short-
stay visas, transit visas through the territory of  the Member States and transit 
visas through the international areas of  airports have been also harmonized 
in EU law. This harmonization has been carried out mainly through the 2009 
63 The Schengen acquis – Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of  14 June 
1985 between the Governments of  the States of  Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Re-
public of  Germany and French republic on the gradual abolition of  checks at their common 
borders, [2000] OJ L239/19. Article 5, which states the general requirements for aliens to be 
granted entry into the Schengen area was repealed by Article 39.1 of  the Schengen Borders 
Code.
64 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006, art. 5, repealed by Regulation (EU) 2016/399, which states 
these conditions in article 6. 
65 Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  14 No-
vember 2018 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of  visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement 
(codification) [2018] OJ L303/39.
66 Regulation (EU) 2018/1806, Preamble (8) and art. 3.2.
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Visa Code.67 This Code does not recognize refugees a special status neither. 
It is applicable to those nationals subject to the obligation to obtain a visa in 
accordance with the list of  countries provided by Regulation 2018/1806.68 
Therefore, refugees are granted in this Code the same treatment as nationals 
of  the State in which they reside, regardless of  their recognition as refugees. 
It does not include any reference to refugees who have not been yet forma-
lly recognized. Likewise, the Schengen Borders Code also requires holding 
a visa to nationals of  any country that is blacklisted.69 The first conclusion 
thus far is that visas are required to refugees under the same conditions as 
any other third-country national. The question is then what is the applicable 
regime to those refugees not holding a visa who manage to reach the border 
of  the country of  destination. In these cases, according to the SBC and the 
Visa Code, States may authorise refugees to enter their territory, “if  a visa is 
issued at the border.” 70  However, since the fulfilment of  the requirements 
to obtain a visa pose serious difficulties for refugees, SBC states that refusal 
to entry “shall be without prejudice to the application of  special provisions 
concerning the right of  asylum and to international protection.”71 
The key issue is whether this provision exempt refugees from the need 
to obtain a visa: on the one hand, it seems that the visa requirement is man-
datory for refugees, since no exception is established for them in the rules 
that specifically regulate the visa requirement in the EU. On the other hand, 
however, the refusal to enter shall respect the right of  asylum and interna-
cional protection. Thus, although the Visa Code does not grant favourable 
treatment to asylum seekers or refugees, implying that in principle they are 
to comply with the requirements on the same footing as any national of  a 
blacklisted State, they are exempt from the visa requirement according to the 
SBC. The paradox then is that refugees are not exempt from holding a visa 
until the very moment when this requirement is enforced, that is, when it is 
67 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  13 July 
2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) [2009] L 243/1, art 1.1 (“Visa 
Code”).
68 Visa Code, art 1.2.
69 Regulation (EU) 2016/399, art. 6.1.b.
70 SBC, art. 6.5.b; Visa Code, art. 35 and 36. 
71 SBC, art 14.1.
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checked whether the person complies with the entry conditions established 
in the SBC.72
In the view of  some scholars, 73 it should be understood that refugees are 
exempted from the obligation to obtain a visa, since this is what is most con-
sistent with other applicable rules, including art. 5 of  the CISA74 and art. 4 of  
the SBC.75 This interpretation is also consistent with national norms, among 
them, Spanish rules on foreigners, which provide that entry requirements are 
not applicable to foreigners who apply for the right to asylum at the moment 
of  entry in the Spanish territory.76
Nevertheless, even if  we accept this interpretacion, difficulties in acces-
sing international protection remain for refugees. Firstly, they are not exemp-
ted from the visa until the very moment they are ready to cross the external 
borders of  the Union, that is, when entry conditions established in the SBC 
and the internal laws of  the States are triggered. In sum, if  the legal con-
sequence of  the joint reading of  the previous rules is that refugees do not 
have to obtain a visa, it is difficult to understand why the Visa Code does not 
establish an explicit exception in that regard.
Secondly, this must be examined in the light of  the practices of  Member 
States and the instruments they use to implement entry conditions. What sta-
te practice shows is that the standard procedure for carriers and officials de-
ployed in foreign airports and borders is checking that individuals hold a visa, 
without any consideration of  the rights of  asylum seekers or refugees. Thus, 
standard procedures could be highly problematic if  the checks are not ac-
companied by proper guarantees for refugees.77 Moreover, the SBC requires 
other entry conditions that refugees are unlikely to fulfil, notably documents 
in which they have to justify the purpose and conditions of  the stay and that 
72 den HeijeR, M., op. cit, 173–174.
73 Ibid; moReno lax, V., op. cit. (2008), 327-328.
74 CISA, art. 5.2: ” These rules shall not preclude the application of  special provisions con-
cerning the right of  asylum.”
75 SBC, art. 4: “in the application of  this Regulation, the Member States shall act in full 
respect of  the (…) applicable international law, including the Convention on the Status of  
Refugees made in Geneva on July 28, 1951; of  the obligations related to access to interna-
tional protection, especially the principle of  non-refoulement, and of  fundamental rights”.
76 Ley orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, de extranjería, art 25.3.
77 den HeijeR, op. cit., 173–174.
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they have sufficient means of  subsistence for the duration of  the stay and for 
the return to their country of  origin.78
Finally, Member States are free to create more favourable conditions for 
asylum-seekers through the issuing of  visas with limited territorial validity 
based on humanitarian grounds, national interest or because of  international 
obligations79 and the regulation of  long stay visas subject to their domestic 
procedures and rules. The interpretation of  “international obligations” was 
a key issue in the request for a preliminary ruling submitted to the Court of  
Justice of  the EU by the Belgium Conseil du Contentieux des ‘Etrangers in 
the case X and X vs. Belgium but the Court, against the opinion of  the Advo-
cate General, refused to address this question on the grounds that the visa 
application submitted by a Syrian family was outside of  the scope of  the Visa 
Code.80
b. Carrier sanctions
As explained above, the mere fact of  not holding a visa does not in itself  
prevent access to the EU. Asylum-seekers could present themselves at the 
EU external borders and make an asylum claim that has to be examined by 
national authorities of  the Member States, which are subject to the obliga-
tion of  non-refoulement. However, the visa requirement has to be analysed in 
close connection to the EU’s carrier sanction system, which has transformed 
the visa requirement into a “precondition” which precludes individuals from 
even leaving their country of  origin.81
Article 26 of  the CISA lays down the duty of  Member States to incor-
porate into their national laws three kinds of  obligations for carriers which 
bring third country nationals by air, sea or land to the external borders of  
the EU: (i) the obligation to assume responsibility for aliens who are refused 
entry into the territory of  one of  the Member States and to return them 
to the third State from which they were transported or which issued their 
travel documents or any other third State “to which they are certain to be 
78 SBC, art 5.1.c.
79 Visa Code, art. 25. 
80 Judgment of  the Court (Grand Chamber) of  7 March 2017, X and X v État belge, C-638/16 
PPU, C:2017:173.
81 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and Gammeltoft-Hansen, H., “The Rights to Seek-Revisited: 
On the UN Human Rights Declaration Article 14 and Access to Asylum Procedures in the 
EU”, European Journal of  Migration and Law, nº 10, 2008, pp. 439, 450–451.
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admitted”,82 (ii) the obligation to check that aliens are in possession of  the 
travel documents required for entry into the territory of  the Member States, 
and (iii) the obligation to pay financial penalties in case they fail to meet their 
control obligations.
Article 26 CISA and the Preamble of  Directive 2001/51/EC, which 
complements Article 26, set forth that the application of  these provisions is 
without prejudice to the obligations resulting from the Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of  Refugees.83  Thus, as a matter of  principle, carrier 
sanctions regimes shall respect international refugee obligations. Notwiths-
tanding this, some problems have to be underlined in practice.84  First, the 
regime depends on the assessment by private carriers of  whether passengers 
who claim asylum have a founded claim. The issue is that frequently they lack 
proper expertise and training. Second, limitations of  time and the expedient 
nature of  boarding procedures make it unlikely that private carriers undertake 
assessments seriously. Third, in order to avoid fines and return obligations, 
private carriers tend to rely exclusively on the examination of  travel docu-
ments, without any consideration of  asylum claims. Fourth, if  carrier sanc-
tions regime should not prejudice asylum seekers and refugee rights, one pos-
sible interpretation is to consider that asylum seekers fall outside the scope 
of  the regime. Thus, carriers would be allowed to board individuals without 
travel documents provided that they file an asylum claim when arriving at the 
EU’s external border. However, it is argued that such an interpretation would 
make the carrier regime prone to abuses if  every undocumented migrant 
claims asylum. Fifth, there is not uniformity in the implementation of  sanc-
tions by Member States. Some Member States impose sanctions on carriers 
regardless of  the involvement of  refugees, some release carriers from the 
82 Article 26.3 establishes some exceptions in cases of  land border traffic. 
83 Council Directive 2001/51/EC of  28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of  Article 
26 of  the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of  14 June 1985 [2001] OJ 
L187/45, Preamble, para 3.
84 moReno lax, op. cit., pp. 326–327; den HeijeR, op. cit., pp. 174–177; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
T. and Gammeltoft-Hansen, H., op. cit., pp. 439 and 451. See also scHolten, S. and mindeR-
Houd, P., “Regulating Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands”, European 
Journal of  Migration and Law, nº 10, 2008 and BasaRan, E., “Evaluation of  the Carriers’ Lia-
bility Regimen as Part of  the EU Asylum Policy under Public International Law”, Uluslararas 
Hukuk ve Politika, nº 15, 2008. 
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sanctions if  individuals are admitted to asylum procedures, and others release 
them only if  asylum seekers are granted refugee status.
Along with this potentiality of  the EU’s carrier sanctions systems to pre-
clude asylum seekers from accessing EU territory, another problematic issue 
is that this measure implies a “privatisation of  migration control” where state 
functions are assumed by private companies which are not directly bound by 
international human rights standards and usually act on economic grounds 
which prompt private carriers to be cautious and reject any doubtful passen-
ger.85
c. Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) in third countries
A third mechanism that plays an important role in preventing asylum 
seekers from entering the EU is the deployment of  officials of  the destina-
tion country in the country of  origin or transit, usually at their airports or 
consulates. What is most remarkable of  this mechanism in the EU context is 
the multiplicity of  bodies and networks established. First, Council Regulation 
377/2004 created a network of  “Immigration Liaisons Officers” (ILOs) in 
order to coordinate the activities of  the EU Member States’ officers posted in 
non-EU States.86 Second, on 27 May 2005 seven EU Member States signed a 
Convention aimed at the stepping up of  cross-border cooperation (the Prüm 
Convention), which envisaged, in compliance with the ILO Regulation, the 
secondment of  “document advisers” to States deemed as origin or transit 
countries for illegal immigration.87 Third, Regulation 1168/2011 authorised 
Frontex to send liaison officers to third States which were integrated into 
85 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and Gammeltoft-Hansen, H., op. cit., pp. 439 and 451.
86 Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of  19 February 2004 on the Creation of  an Immi-
gration Liaison Officers Network L 64/1, OJ L64/1 (ILO Regulation), amended by Regu-
lation (EU) No 493/2011 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  5 April 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 on the Creation of  an Immigration Liaison 
Officers Network, [2004] OJ L141/13, repealed by Regulation (EU) 2019/1240 of  the Euro-
pean Parliament and of  the Council of  20 June 2019 on the creation of  a European network 
of  immigration liaison officers (recast), OJ L 198/88 (ILO Regulation).
87 Convention between the Kingdom of  Belgium, the Federal Republic of  Germany, the 
Kingdom of  Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of  Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of  the Netherlands and the Republic of  Austria on the stepping up of  cross-border cooper-
ation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, signed in 
Prüm on 27 May 2005, Arts 20 and 21. Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Slova-
kia and Slovenia are also parties to this Convention which was incorporated into EU law by 
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local or regional ILOs networks. 88 The role of  Frontex Liaison Officers was 
reinforced in the reform of  the agency in 2016 that allowed Frontex to assign 
these officers also in the Member States, in order to “supervise the manage-
ment of  external borders”.89 Finally, in response to the tragic situation in the 
Mediterranean Sea the European Council decided in 2015 to deploy “Euro-
pean Migration Liaison Officers” (EMLOs) in certain key countries.90 This 
decision was subsequently confirmed by the European Migration Agenda 
and the EU Plan of  Action against Migrant Smuggling adopted by the Com-
mission in 2015.91 By January 2017, the European Union already had thirteen 
European Liaison Officers deployed in “priority third countries”92.
Considering the challenge of  coordinating the activities of  these bo-
dies of  liaison officers deployed by different competent authorities and of  
avoiding overlaps of  mandates and tasks, the EU has recently approved a 
new Regulation establishing a network of  “European Immigration Liaison 
Officers” (ILO Regulation).93 The new Regulation 2019/1240 establishes a 
formal governance mechanism (Steering Board) composed of  representati-
ves of  Member States, the Commission and EU Agencies (Frontex, Europol 
and EASO) in order to enhance coordination and to optimise utilisation of  
ILOs.94
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of  23 June 2008 on the Stepping up of  Cross-Border Co-
operation, particularly in Combating Terrorism and Cross-Border Crime, [2008] OJ L 210/1.
88 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of  26 October 2004 establishing a European 
Agency for the Management of  Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of  the 
Member States of  the European Union, OJ L349/1, amended by Regulation 1168/2911, OJ 
L3014/1, art. 14.3.
89 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  14 Sep-
tember 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 863/2007 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, OJ L251/1, art. 8.1.c) and 12.
90 Special meeting of  the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement. Press release.
91 COM(2015) 285 final, pp. 6-7.
92 European Commission, “DG HOME hosts European Migration Liaison Officers (EM-
LOs)” (Press Release), 18 de enero de 2017.
93 Regulation (EU) 2019/1240 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  20 June 
2019 on the creation of  a European network of  immigration liaison officers (recast).
94 Regulation 2019/1240, art. 7.2.
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The main concern for the protection of  refugees presented by this me-
chanism is the lack of  clarity regarding the tasks the officials are entrusted 
with. The new ILO Regulation essentially mantains the same task scheme 
than Regulation 377/2014: (i) to establish and maintain contacts with the 
competent authorities and relevant organizations operating within the third 
country; (ii) collecting information in certain “concern issues” such as com-
position of  migratory flows and migrants’ intended destionation, routes used 
by migratory flows to reach the territories of  the Member States, the existen-
ce, activities and modus operandi of  criminal organisations involved in the 
smuggling of  migrants; (iii) coordinating among themselves and with rele-
vant stakeholders regarding the provision of  their capacity-building activities 
to the local authorities; (iv) rendering assistance in establishing the identity 
of  the different type of  migrants and sharing information within networks 
of  ILOs and with Member States’ authorities in order to prevent and detect 
illegal immigration and combat smuggling of  migrants and trafficking in hu-
man beings.95
Although according to these tasks ILOs should not influence the sove-
reign tasks of  the host countries, in practice they impede individuals from 
exiting the country, either directly or through advice or recommendation to 
carriers or authorities in the country of  origin or transit.96 Among the func-
tions listed in article 3 there is no mention of  their role regarding interna-
tional carriers’ activities. However, article 5.1.d) of  Regulation 2019/1240 
states that they shall “coordinate positions (among ILOs networks and with 
officials deployed by third States) to be adopted in contacts with commercial 
carriers.” The nature of  the “contacts” with carriers is controversial since 
they are receiving the advice from an official of  a State that is entitled to fine 
them if  they fail to check whether individuals hold the required documenta-
tion to enter into the EU.97 In addition, the lack of  transparency regarding the 
activities of  these officials has been denounced, since no public information 
is provided in connection with them. The 2004 ILO Regulation envisaged 
95 Regulation 2019/1240, art 3.3 – 3.6.
96 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and Gammeltoft-Hansen, H., op. cit., pp. 439 and 452; weinzieRl, 
R, and lisson, U., Border Management and Human Rights. A study of  EU Law and the Law of  the 
Sea, German Institute for Human Rights, 2007, pp. 27-28; Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and 
HatHaway, J.C., op. cit, pp. 235 and 253.
97 mcnamaRa, F., op. cit., pp. 319 and 330.
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biannual reports to the Council and the Commission but these reports were 
classified. Indeed they have been removed from new Regulation 2019/1240.
Finally, one of  the main issues regarding the protection of  asylum seakers, 
namely the total disconnection of  Regulation 377/2014 from refugee rights 
and from the need to comply with the relevant EU law on border control 
and visas, has been partially addressed in the new ILO Regulation. According 
to article 3.6.b) ILOs “may” render assistance in “confirming the identity of  
persons in need of  international protection for the purposes of  facilitating 
their resettlement in the Union, including by providing them, where possible, 
with adequate pre-departure information and support.” Although this is a 
positive improvement it is surprising that this is the only task that Regulation 
2019/1240 has established on a discretionary basis. Moreover, we must wait 
to see how this provision is implemented in practice.
Lastly, a brief  mention to the controversial judgement of  the UK’s House 
of  Lords in Roma Rights has to be made, since it is a good example to show 
how ILOs can affect refugees’rights in practice. The issue under appeal was 
the lawfulness of  the procedures adopted by British immigration officers 
temporarily stationed at Prague Airport. The appellants, six Czech nationals 
of  Romani ethnic origin, intended to leave the Czech Republic and enter 
into the UK but were refused permission to leave the country by the British 
immigration officers. This judgement is one of  the most controversial in con-
nection with the territorial scope of  the Geneva Convention relating to the 
Status of  Refugees, since the House of  Lords argued that the duty of  non-re-
foulement was applicable exclusively to those refugees who had managed to en-
ter the territory of  the State. Consequently, according to the House of  Lords 
the Geneva Convention contracting States do not have legal duties towards 
refugees who find themselves outside their territories or at their frontiers.98
B. ACTIVE INTERCEPTION: INTERCEPTION AT SEA 
 AND THE ROLE OF FRONTEX
A traditional form of  non-arrival policy is the interdiction of  migrants 
on the high seas or in the territorial waters of  third countries. This is the 
paradigmatic example of  active interception. Not only have the EU Member 
98 Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma 
Rights Centre and others (Appellants), [2004] UKHL 55, 14–16.
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States been engaged in these types of  practices, so has the EU itself  as well, 
through joint operations coordinated by Frontex.
There are three main categories of  extraterritorial strategies deployed by 
the EU and the EU Member States to intercept refugees and migrants by sea: 
joint operations in territorial waters of  third countries, based on agreements 
(usually under the “shiprider model”) that allow EU Member States to parti-
cipate in border patrols in the territorial waters of  third countries of  origin of  
refugees and migrants;99 “push-backs” or interdiction and summary returns 
of  migrants to third countries;100 and rescue operations followed by disem-
barkation in a third country. The main issue regarding rescue operations is 
the identification of  the place of  disembarkation of  the rescued passengers, 
especially in those cases where, as we have witnessed recently, coastal states 
do not accept such disembarkation in their ports and the dispute among 
States results in long negotiations during which the most basic needs of  the 
refugees and migrants are not provided for.
Frontex is currently running three permanent operations in the EU Mem-
ber States where the migratory pressure is higher (Greece, Italy and Spain). 
Approximately, 1,500 border guards are deployed in these operations, along 
with vessels, planes, helicopters, patrol cars and other equipment.101 The par-
ticipation of  Frontex in operations of  interception of  refugees at sea rai-
ses also a variety of  complex legal issues. One of  the main concerns is the 
protection of  human rights in these operations. There is a lack of  clarity 
in connection with how the protection guarantees set out by the EU and 
international legal framework can be applied to these operations and how 
compliance with these standards can be monitored. Besides, there have been 
reported violations of  human rights in areas covered by Frontex joint ope-
99 This model involves the boarding by third countries” officials in EU Member States” ves-
sels with the exclusive competences to decide on the boarding of  vessels and the arrest of  
individuals on them. For example, Frontex operation Hera III, hosted by Spain, envisaged 
the placement of  Senegalese and Mauritanian agents on EU Member States” vessels with 
similar competencies.
100 The prominent example is the Italian push-backs of  migrants to Libya and Algeria. See 
the Memorandum of  understanding of  2 February 2017 on cooperation in the fields of  
development, the fight against illegal immigration, human trafficking and fuel smuggling and 
on reinforcing the security of  borders between the State of  Libya and the Italian Republic. 
101 Operations Indalo (Western Mediterranean), Themis (Central Mediterranean) and Poseidon 
(Easter Mediterranean). See FRONTEX, 2018 in Brief, Frontex, 2018, pp- 8-9.
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rations, for example, in connection with the practices of  Greece, Italy, Spain 
and Cyprus.102 Moreover, Border control operations coordinated by Frontex 
at sea might push refugees to choose more risky routes in their travel to Eu-
rope’s shores. A study by the Spanish Commission for Refugee Assistance 
(CEAR) showed that Frontex operations off  the coast of  the Greek island of  
Lesbos blocked the northern route from Turkey to this island (9 km) and as 
a consequence, refugees were diverted to a more dangerous and longer route 
(21 km), which exposed them to great vulnerabilities.103
Another issue is the attribution of  responsibilities and the identification 
of  the real role of  Frontex in the interception of  refugees. This lack of  cla-
rity in Frontex mandate was one of  the objectives to be addressed by the 
reform of  the Agency in 2016. Regulation 2016/1624 considerably increases 
the number of  tasks attributed to Frontex on the grounds of  a very extensive 
notion of  “European integrated border management.”104 Besides, whereas 
previous Regulation 2007/2004 stated that only the States were responsi-
ble for the control and surveillance of  external borders,105 article 5 of  the 
new Regulation lays down that this is a “shared responsibility of  the Agency 
and of  national authorities responsible for border management.” In Frontex 
words, for the first time, the Agency acts as an “operational arm of  the EU” 
and as “an even closer partner for the Member States.”106 However, despite 
the expectations generated the new Regulation has not definitively clarified 
the issue. Indeed, after including the notion of  shared responsibility, article 
5 establishes that “Member States shall retain primary responsibility for the 
management of  their sections of  the external borders” and “shall ensure 
102 Human RiGHts watcH, The EU”s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of  Migrant 
Detainees in Greece, Human Rights Watch, 2011; coGolati, S., veRlinden, N., and scHmitt, 
P, op. cit., 31. See also Baldaccini, A., “Extraterritorial Border Controls in the EU: The Role 
of  Frontex in Operations by Sea” in Ryan, B. and mitsileGas. V., op. cit., pp. 243–244; and 
moReno lax, V., op. cit. (2011), pp. 174, 184.
103 CEAR, Lesbos, “zona cero” del derecho de asilo, CEAR, 2016), p. 9. williams, K. y mountz, 
A., “Rising tide. Analyzing the relationship between externalización and migrant deaths and 
boat losses”, in zaiotti, R., (ed.), Externalizing Migration Management. Europe, Noth America and 
the spread of  «remote control» practices, Routledge, 2016, pp. 31-49.
104 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  14 Sep-
tember 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard.
105 Regulation 2007/2004, art. 1.2.
106 FRONTEX, Annual Activity Report 2017, Frontex, 2018, p. 7.
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the management of  their external borders” while Frontex “shall support the 
application of  Union measures relating to the management of  the external 
borders by reinforcing, assessing and coordinating the actions of  Member 
States.” We may question what is then the meaning of  shared responsibility 
since States are the “primary” responsible  and the Agency’s role is limited to 
“supporting, reinforcing and coordinating” its actions. In sum, this provision 
perpetuates the old distribution of  responsibilities between the agency and 
the States. Therefore, one of  the main criticism of  the new European Bor-
der and Coast Guard established by Regulation 2016/1624 is that “it is only a 
name.” 107 In sum, the absence of  clarity in connection to the exact scope of  
Frontex’s mandate makes it extremely difficult to establish which authority 
should be held responsible for the protection of  the individuals intercepted.
III. COMPATIBILITY OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF PRE-BORDER CONTROL WITH 
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
REFOULEMENT
As explained, the EU Member States, individually or under the umbrella 
of  the EU’s strategy on integrated border management, are increasingly un-
dertaking interception measures, both passive and active, outside their terri-
tories and territorial seas, with the purpose of  forcing refugees back to their 
places of  origin or the territory or territorial waters of  other states. These 
strategies result in refugees being denied any direct contact with the recei-
ving state and, as a consequence, protection of  their rights.108 In the light of  
international standards for the protection of  refugees, these measures might 
imply an unjustified restriction on the “right to seek asylum” as well as an 
infringement of  the principle of  non-refoulement laid down in Article 33 of  the 
1951 Refugee Convention. The key question then is to determine the territo-
rial scope of  states’ obligations toward refugees, namely whether the duty of  
non-refoulement is extraterritorially applicable.
107 caRReRa, S. and den HeRtoG, L., ”A European Border and Coast Guard: What’s in a 
name?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, nº 88, 2016, pp. 1-19.
108 HatHaway, J., op. cit., p. 279.
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1. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICABILITY OF NON-REFOULEMENT PRINCIPLE
The duty of  non-refoulement is the cornerstone or centrepiece of  the inter-
national refugee protection regime.109 Since the Refugee Convention does not 
guarantee a right to “obtain” asylum, the non-refoulement principle constitutes 
the ‘strongest commitment that the international community of  States has 
been willing to make to those who are no longer able to avail themselves of  
the protection of  their own government”.110
Unlike other articles of  the Refugee Convention, which require refugees 
to be inside the territory of  the receiving state in order to grant them the 
rights set out in the Convention,111 Article 33 does not contain any spatial or 
territorial limitation. However, nor does the Refugee Convention contain a 
duty of  States to protect refugees’ rights in the world at large.112 This appa-
rent ambiguity in the determination of  the territorial scope of  the duty of  
non-refoulement has led some States to deny its extraterritorial applicability. One 
of  the most prominent cases of  denial of  the extraterritorial applicability of  
the duty of  non-refoulement is the US Supreme Court’s decision in the case Sale 
v Haitian Centers Council where the Court argued that the Geneva Conven-
tion could not impose “uncontemplated” extraterritorial obligations on those 
who ratify it through “no more than its general humanitarian intent.”113
In the same vein, the UK’s House of  Lords denied in Roma Rights the 
application of  the duty of  non-refoulement towards those refugees who ‘seek 
entrance into the territory” but have not yet managed to enter into the te-
rritory.114 The particularity of  this case was that, like other passive measures 
109 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T., Access to Asylum. International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of  
Migration Control, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 44.
110 Ibid, 44. See also UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of  
Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of  Refu-
gees and its 1967 Protocol (2007), para 5 and wouteRs, K., International Legal Standards for the 
Protection from Refoulement, Intersetia, 2009, p. 33.
111 For example, arts 17-19 on gainful employment, 21 on housing and 24 on labour legisla-
tion and social security.
112 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and HatHaway, J.C., op. cit., p. 258.
113 United States Supreme Court, Sale, acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
et al. v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., et al. (1993) 509 U.S. 155 (1993), 183.
114 Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma 
Rights Centre and others (Appellants), [2004] UKHL 55, para 17 (Roma Rights).
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previously examined (for example, carrier sanctions and visa regimes), the 
claimants were intercepted before leaving the country, so they failed to meet 
one of  the requirements for the Refugee Convention to be applicable, that is, 
to be “outside the country of  his nationality [...] or the country of  his former 
habitual residence.”115 The House of  Lords did not accept a “purposive inter-
pretation” of  the Convention based on its humanitarian objects and denied 
the extraterritorial application of  Article 33.116
Despite this restrictive understanding of  the territorial scope of  the Re-
fugee Convention, in particular of  the duty of  non-refoulement, a significant 
number of  scholars117 contend that the duty is applicable not only within 
the territory of  the State and at its border, but also in relation to any refugee 
subject to or within the jurisdiction of  the state. This position incorporates the in-
terpretation of  the refoulement prohibition within the broader framework of  
the extraterritorial applicability of  international and regional human rights 
instruments, in particular regarding its understanding of  the concept of  ju-
risdiction. In the view of  Hathaway, certain Convention rights, among which 
is the principle of  non-refoulement, are not subject to any territorial limitation. 
The obligation of  States to respect these rights arises wherever “a State exer-
cises effective or de facto jurisdiction outside its own territory” either by State 
agents themselves, by private companies hired by governments, or by officials 
of  a transit country acting on behalf  of  a destination State.118 This opinion 
is also supported by Goodwin-Gill and Mc Adam, who postulate that Article 
33 does not require any physical presence in the territory, but prohibits the re-
turn of  refugees “in any manner whatsoever” irrespective of  the place where 
the relevant action occurs (at border posts, at transit points, in international 
115 Refugee Convention, art. 1.A.2.
116 Roma Rights, para 18. The claim was, nevertheless, successful because the House of  Lord 
considered that the pre-clearance procedure was discriminatory on racial grounds.
117 There are also contrary opinions. See, RoBinson, N., Convention Relating to the Status of  Refu-
gees. Its History, Significance and Contents, Institute of  Jewish Affairs, 1952, p. 29.; GRaHl-mad-
sen, A., Territorial Asylum, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1980, p. 40; aGa 
kHan, S., united nations HiGH commissioneR foR RefuGees, “Legal Problems Relating to 
Refugees and Displaced Persons”, Recueil Des Cours, Collected Courses of  the Hague Academy of  
International Law, nº 149 (I), 1976, pp. 287-352 and 317-318.
118 HatHaway, op. cit., pp. 335–342.
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zones, beyond the national territory of  the States, etc.).119 These authors go 
further, pointing out that the principle of  non-refoulement has crystallised into a 
rule of  customary international law, binding on all states whether or not they 
are parties to the Refugee Convention. The core content of  this customary 
rule is the “prohibition of  return in any manner whatsoever of  refugees to 
countries where they may face persecution”120. The territorial scope of  this 
rule is informed by this essential purpose of  the prohibition, thus regulating 
state action “wherever it takes place.”121
This is also the view of  the UNHCR in its Advisory Opinion on the 
Extraterritorial Application of  Non-Refoulement Obligations under the Re-
fugee Convention, which stresses the paramount importance of  the concept 
of  jurisdiction in the sense that the States are bound by Article 33 wherever 
they exercise effective jurisdiction.122
In sum, there are strong legal grounds to admit the extraterritorial appli-
cation of  the duty of  non-refoulement. However, there are significant gaps in the 
protective scope of  Article 33 which have special relevance here. First, the 
duty of  non-refoulement does not cover cases of  mass influx of  refugees insofar 
as it threatens the ability of  the State to protect its national interests. But most 
importantly, the duty of  non-refoulement does not limit passive measures of  in-
terception such as visa controls, carrier sanctions or ILOs, since refugees are 
not allowed to leave the territory of  their own states. As the Roma Rights case 
shows, one compulsory requirement for refugees to be protected is that they 
actually leave their countries. Until and unless this requirement is met they are 
not entitled to the protection of  Article 33.123 With the aim of  overcoming 
this second restriction, it has been argued that States must interpret treaties, 
including the duty of  non-refoulement laid down in the Refugee Convention, in 
good faith, according to the principle of  pacta sunt servanda as stated in Article 
26 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties. This argument was re-
119 Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and mcadam, J., op. cit., p. 246.
120 Ibid, p. 248.
121 Ibid.
122 UNHCR, op. cit., para 43.
123 HatHaway, J.C., op. cit., p. 367. See also Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and mcadam, op. cit., p. 385.
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jected, though, by the House of  Lords in Roma Rights insofar as interpreting a 
treaty according to its wording cannot be contrary to good faith.124
2. RESPONSES TO THE GAPS IN THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
The above mentioned gap in the protection offered by the Refugee Con-
vention has been referred as an “intractable dilemma” to the extent that as 
long as States do not find themselves bound by a duty to allow refugees to 
seek asylum in other countries, it is extremely difficult to find a proper res-
ponse in international law to those measures of  passive interception which 
“imprison would-be refugees within their own States.”125 Some alternative 
responses are exposed in following sections.
A. ARTICLE 31 OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
Article 31 of  the Refugee Convention prohibits States from imposing 
penalties on those refugees that enter irregularly into their territories. This 
provision implies an acknowledgement that due to the circumstances that 
lead refugees to escape they are not usually in possession of  the documen-
tation required to enter into the country. Read in conjunction with Article 
33 and the right to leave a country and seek asylum, which will be discussed 
below, this article upholds the recognition of  the right of  refugees to obtain 
temporary admission in the territory of  a state in order to have access to re-
fugee status determination procedures.126 According to the UNHCR, this is 
necessary in order to give effect to states” obligations under the Convention, 
meaning that they must at least grant asylum-seekers, access to their territo-
ries and to fair and efficient asylum procedures.127
However, despite the clarity of  the wording of  Article 31, this article has 
been disregarded in practice by States. Refugees who, according to this article, 
enter into a country without holding proper documentation frequently suffer 
from the so called “imputation of  double criminality”, that is, they become 
under domestic law the “unlawful non-citizen” who has entered irregularly 
124 Roma Rights, para 19. 
125 HatHaway, op. cit., p. 368.
126 Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and mcadam, J., op. cit., pp. 384-385.
127 UNHCR, op. cit., para 8.
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and is “aligned with crime” by national authorities and the media so that his 
or her claim is assumed to be illegitimate.128
B. THE DUTY OF NON-REFOULEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL  
AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
This second alternative provides strong arguments for reinforcing the Re-
fugee Convention’s duty of  non-refoulement. The major human rights treaties 
have also established non-refoulement obligations for States, either through ex-
plicit provisions such as Article 3 of  the Convention against Torture (CAT), 
Article 22(8) of  the American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 
2(3) of  the OAU Convention governing the Specific Aspects of  Refugee 
Problems in Africa, or indirectly by means of  the prohibition of  torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, such as Article 
3 of  the ECHR and Article 7 of  the ICCPR. With regard to the scope of  
obligations under Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR, as construed by the 
Human Rights Committee and the ECtHR, they also encompass the prohi-
bition of  exposing individuals to the danger of  torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country through 
their extradition, expulsion or return.129
Unlike Article 33 of  the Refugee Convention, these standards of  human 
rights law do not require the refugee to be outside of  his or her country 
in order to trigger the State’s duty of  non-refoulement. Thus, ILOs in foreign 
airports or airline carriers who refuse embarkation to individuals at risk of  
persecution in the country they wish to leave could be considered a breach of  
the non-refoulement obligations of  destination States, as stated in human rights 
instruments.130
In addition, international bodies in charge of  interpreting these instru-
ments have been much more prone to the applicability of  the non-refoulement 
obligations of  States in an extraterritorial context. One central case is the 
128 Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and mcadam, J., op. cit., pp. 384–385. See also HatHaway, op. cit., pp. 
370–371.
129 In this regard, see Human RiGHts committee, General Comment nº 20 on Article 7 (Pro-
hibition of  torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Forty-
fourth session, 1992, para 9; and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECtHR 23 
February 2012), para 123.
130 Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and mcadam, J., op. cit., pp. 385–387; HatHaway, op. cit., pp. 368–369. 
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ECtHR decision in the case of  Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy.131 The case was 
brought by 11 Somali nationals and 13 Eritrean nationals who were part of  a 
group of  about two hundred individuals who, departing from Libya, attemp-
ted to reach the Italian coast by boat. They were intercepted on the high seas 
by three ships from the Italian Revenue Police and the Coastguard, transfe-
rred to Italian military ships where their personal effects and documentation 
were confiscated, and returned back to Tripoli.132 The ECtHR found that the 
interception of  the vessels by the Italian authorities constituted an exercise of  
extraterritorial jurisdiction by Italy, triggering its obligations under the Con-
vention.133 In particular, the Court, although recognising the rights of  States 
to establish their own immigration policies, considered that the removal of  
aliens in the context of  interceptions on the high seas with the aim of  pre-
venting them from reaching the borders of  the state or pushing them back 
to another state constituted an exercise of  jurisdiction which engaged Italy’s 
responsibility.134 The Court stressed that “problems with managing migratory 
flows cannot justify having recourse to practices which are not compatible 
with the State’s obligations under the Convention” and that treaties must 
be interpreted in good faith bearing in mind the object and purpose of  the 
treaty.135
The Committee against Torture has also established the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of  States engaged in the interception of  boats on the high seas. 
In the Marine I case136 a Spanish maritime rescue tug, in response to a dis-
tress call sent by the vessel Marine I, which carried 369 immigrants from 
131 See Bollo aRocena, M.D., “Push Back, expulsions colectivas y non refoulement: Algunas 
reflexiones a propósto de la sentencia dictada por la gran sala del TEDH en el caso Hirsi 
Jamaa y otros c. Italia” in toRRes BeRnáRdez, S. (coord.), El derecho internacional en el mundo 
multipolar del siglo XXI: Obra homenaje al profesor Luis Ignacio Sánchez Rodríguez, Iprolex 2013, p. 
647; and moReno lax, V. “Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy or the Strasbourg Court versus Ext-
raterritorial Migration Control?”, Human Rights Law Review, nº 12(3), 2012, p. 574.
132 Hirsi Jamaa, para 9–11.
133 Ibid, para 178.
134 Ibid, para 180.
135 Ibid, para 179.
136 Committee against Torture, J.H.A. v Spain, Communication no. 323/2007, CAT/C/41/
D323/2007, (Marine I). See wouteRs, K, and den HeijeR, M., “The Marine I Case: A Com-
ment”, International Journal of  Refugee Law, nº 22(1), 2009.
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various Asian and African countries, towed Marine I from international wa-
ters towards the Mauritanian coast. Diplomatic negotiations began between 
Spain, Senegal and Mauritania regarding the fate of  the vessel, and an agree-
ment was reached by Spain and Mauritania eight days after the interception, 
during which time the ships remained anchored off  the Mauritanian coast. 
Following the agreement, the passengers were disembarked in Mauritania and 
the Spanish national police force proceeded to identify them. During the re-
cognition procedure they declared that they were fleeing persecution in India 
as a result of  the conflict in Kashmir. The passengers were placed in a for-
mer fish processing plant under Spanish control throughout the repatriation 
process.137 The claimants alleged a violation of  Article 1 of  the Convention 
against Torture on the grounds that their treatment by the Spanish authori-
ties amounted to torture and of  Article 3 because, if  returned to India, they 
would be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.138 
During the complaint procedure Spain denied its jurisdiction over the pass-
engers because the incidents took place outside Spanish territory.139 However, 
the Committee considered that Spain had de facto jurisdiction over the persons 
on board Marine I “from the time the vessel was rescued and throughout the 
identification and repatriation process.”140 The exercise of  extraterritorial ju-
risdiction of  the state in cases of  interception in territorial waters of  a third 
state was also postulated by the Committee against Torture in the Sonko case, 
brought against Spain.141
C. THE RIGHT TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY
The right to leave any country including one’s own is laid down in several 
human rights instruments, namely, Article 13(1) of  the Universal Declaration 
of  Human Rights, Article 12 ICCPR, Article 2 of  Protocol 4 of  the ECHR, 
Article 22 of  the American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 12(2) 
of  the African Charter on Human and Peoples” Rights. It is not an absolute 
right and the above mentioned provisions establish limitations on grounds 
137 Marine I, para 2.1 – 2.6.
138 Ibid, paras 3.1–3.3.
139 Ibid, para 6.1.
140 Ibid, para 8.2.
141 Committee against Torture, Fatou Sonko v Spain, Communication no. 368/2008, 
CAT/C/47/D368/2008, para 10.3.
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such as national security, public order or the needs of  a democratic society. 
However, as the Human Rights Committee has pointed out, restrictions of  
this right must be “provided by law, must be necessary in a democratic society 
for the protection of  these purposes and must be consistent with all other ri-
ghts recognized in the Covenant.” Further, they must respect the principle of  
proportionality, be the least intrusive instrument to achieve the desired result, 
and be proportionate to the interest to be protected.142 Immigration controls 
that restrict an individual’s rights to leave do not meet these requirements.143
Nevertheless, there is no international mechanism to implement this ri-
ght. Thus, there are no legal provisions which require the right to leave to be 
complemented by a “duty to admit” by other States. It has been considered, 
then, an “incomplete right” since there is not a correlative obligation on other 
States to allow entry to individuals other than their own nationals.144 Howe-
ver, in the context of  refugee protection some scholars refer to the “right 
to leave to seek asylum from persecution”. In this particular context they 
contend that the right encompasses a correlative duty on other states, which 
consists of  the prohibition of  controlling the movements of  persons in a 
manner that frustrates attempts to find effective protection.145
IV. CONCLUSION
Europe is experiencing its largest movement of  refugees and migrants 
since World War II. The EU reaction to this enormous challenge has given 
rise to heavy criticism. One of  the main critiques refers to the EU’s and EU 
Member States’ recourse to a complex system of  extraterritorial deterrence 
measures and instruments which prevent refugees from having any contact 
with the territory of  the various EU Member States’ territories. The imple-
mentation of  this set of  extraterritorial measures has to be considered as a 
142 Human Rights Committee, General Comment no 27, Freedom of  movement (Article 12), 
1999, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, paras 11–18. See also moReno lax, V., op. cit. (2008), pp. 
351–353.
143 Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and mcadam, J., op. cit., pp. 381–382; den HeijeR, M., op. cit., 246–
247.
144 Goodwin-Gill, G.S. and mcadam, J., op. cit., 382–383. See also moReno lax, V., op. cit. 
(2008), pp. 353–354.
145 Ibid; den HeijeR, op. cit., p. 246.
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factor that exacerbates the inherent vulnerability of  asylum seekers. In addi-
tion to the causes that lead them to flee from their countries of  origin, any 
refugee seeking protection is in a vulnerable situation, and in many cases they 
face compounded vulnerability when they belong to additional categories 
of  vulnerable groups such as women, children or persons with disabilities. 
However, the extraterritorial instruments that have been analysed in this sec-
tion fail to take into account the special protection needs of  asylum seekers 
and may indeed increase their inherent vulnerability.
One of  the main flaws of  these instruments is that they are not imple-
mented in a way that allows effective distinction between refugees and other 
categories of  migrants. Some of  them, such as the EU visa regime, are co-
llectively implemented without any favourable treatment of  asylum seekers 
or refugees, who are to comply with the requirement on the same footing 
as any national of  a blacklisted state. In addition, a considerable number of  
“refugee-producing” countries are included in the so-called visa black list, 
that is, non-EU countries whose nationals must possess a visa to cross the 
external borders of  the EU. Furthermore, some legal instruments such as the 
SBC additionally require some entry conditions that refugees, because of  the 
circumstances that lead them to flee, are unlikely to fulfil, such as documents 
regarding the purpose and conditions of  the stay in the receiving country and 
evidence regarding their means of  subsistence for the duration of  the stay 
and for the return to their country.
Another problematic issue is that some of  these instruments, such as ca-
rrier sanctions, imply a “privatisation of  migration control” in practice, where 
the control of  visa and entry conditions are assumed by private companies 
which frequently lack the proper expertise and training to identify vulnerable 
passengers in need of  protection. They are subject to boarding procedures 
that have to be urgently carried out, which make it very unlikely that carriers 
will undertake serious assessments. Finally, they are said to act on economic 
grounds that lead them to be cautious and to reject any doubtful passengers, 
and, more importantly, they are not directly bound by international human 
rights standards.
Problems in the identification of  vulnerable refugees are exacerbated 
through the deployment in countries of  origin of  ILOs whose role and sta-
tus is very controversial. They are not supposed to have any influence on the 
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control tasks carried out by sovereign host countries, but in practice their 
“advice or recommendation” to carriers or local authorities is crucial in order 
to prevent individuals from exiting the country concerned. Furthermore, no 
public information regarding their activities is provided, which has been the 
object of  strong criticism.
Moreover, some legal instruments that create these instruments fail to 
consider the special vulnerabilities of  refugees and include sometimes appa-
rently contradictory rules. For example, the Visa Code does not exempt refu-
gees from the visa requirement yet the SBC includes such an exemption, so a 
paradox is created due to the fact that refugees are not exempt from holding 
a visa until the very moment when this requirement is enforced in border or 
boarding checks.
Finally, the panorama of  interception measures at sea is not at all encou-
raging. Due to the circumstances in which refugees are forced to travel, their 
vulnerability is especially pronounced in this context. They must frequently 
face high levels of  violence, extortion and exploitation during their journeys. 
Moreover, a direct relationship between the reinforcement of  migration con-
trols and the increase in human smuggling has been reported. The main con-
cern regarding these operations at sea is that in many cases they are in direct 
conflict with the Refugee Convention, notably with the prohibition of  the 
States parties to return refugees to places where they face persecution. Regar-
ding operations coordinated by Frontex the 2016 Regulation has not clarified 
the distribution of  responsibilities among the Agency and the Member States 
whereas problems of  human rights protection are still denounced in these 
operations.
In summary, what these instruments most importantly fail to do is to 
consider the most basic need of  refugees: access to the territory of  foreign 
states where they can find safety from the circumstances that lead them to 
flee. By ignoring this basic need they are also disregarding the most crucial 
guarantee recognised to refugees in both the Refugee Convention, to which 
all the EU Member States are parties, and the main international and regio-
nal human rights treaties, including the ECHR – that is, the prohibition of  
sending refugees back to the hands of  their persecutors or the prohibition 
of  non-refoulement. Denial of  access to territory is therefore one of  the crucial 
factors which makes refugees vulnerable.
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Responses to these challenges must be found in legal, policy and prac-
tical scenarios. Some legal responses to the lack of  protection of  refugees, 
notably regarding the gaps in the Refugee Convention, have been pointed 
out in this article. Among them, international human rights law provides 
one of  the strongest tools to protect refugees against the implementation 
of  “non-entrée policies” by states. In addition, the EU and the EU Member 
States should put in place legal avenues to make it possible the enjoyment of  
refugee’s right to seek asylum in the EU, such as the concession of  humani-
tarian visas, the exemption of  visa requirement for certain vulnerable groups, 
the simplification of  asylum procedures and the documentation required to 
asylum-seekers, or the possibility of  submitting asylum claims in embassies 
located in third countries or to officials carrying functions extraterritorially. 
In the policy arena, EU Member States must find a balance between their 
legitimate right to control access to their territories and to combat terro-
rism, illegal migration and trafficking in human beings, and the international 
standards of  protection for refugees. EU policies are so strongly focused on 
security issues and the fight against illegal immigration that fail to take into 
consideration refugee rights. Evaluations of  the impact of  the policies on 
refugee’s rights and safety are needed to avoid the exposure of  refugees to 
more dangerous journeys to Europe. Humanitarian actors such as the Red 
Cross are calling Europe for the establishment of  search and rescue opera-
tions in the Mediterranean Sea to put an end to the increasing number of  
deaths at sea.146 Finally, EU instruments of  pre-border control should be 
implemented in practice in a manner which incorporates enough guarantees 
to distinguish those who are in need of  international protection and their 
specific vulnerabilities, and should not function as barriers to the right to 
seek asylum. Asylum claims should be individually examined, which requires 
a limitation in the use of  collective procedures such as visa regime and pro-
cedures and carrier sanctions, which involve in practice the externalisation of  
examination procedures to private companies.
146 Red Cross, Eu Office, “Addressing the Vulnerabilities linked to Migratory Routes to 
the European Union”, RCEU, nº 12/2015-002, Position Paper 6.
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